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RECENT CASES
Work and Labor-Recovery on Quasi-Contract Where an Implied.
in-Fact Contract Can Not Be Established. D, a general contractor,
requested and received an estimate of the cost of special work from P, a subcontractor. D used the estimate in computing Is bid, and was awarded the
general contract. When a contract for the special work was not given to P,
he brought suit based upon implied-rn-fact contract for the value of the
services rendered. At the trial P admitted that no mention of payment was
made when the information was given; and D introduced evidence to show
that it was not the custom of the trade to charge for such services:. Verdict
for D. From an order granting P a new trial, D appealed contending that his
motion for a dismissal on the evidence was improperly overruled. Held. The
evidence established a case to be decided by the jury since: (1) it was not
necessary that D expect to pay, if as a reasonable man he should have known
that P expected payment; (2) the fact that P hoped to obtain a subcontract
and made his figures available for that reason is not necessarily inconsistent
with an expectation of payment on his part. Western Asphalt Co. v. Vale, 25
Wn.(2d) 428, 171 P.(2d) 159 (1946).
The court's holding that the evidence established a case for the jury to
decide is not necessaritly sustained by the court's reasoning. Assuming it to
be established that P expected payment, and applying the rule that D will
be held to what he should have known, there is still the question of whether
D should have known that P expected' payment. Basically it is a problem of
the sufficiency of the evidence, and in the case of Meacham v. Pederson, 70
Wash. 479, 127 Pac. 144 (1912), it was held that evidence similar to that
presented in the prncipal case would not support a finding that a contract
(for payment as an alternative to a subcontract) had been entered into between the contractor and subcontractor. The only evidence not found in the
Meacham case that was established in the principal case was that the estimate
was used by D and proved beneficial to him. It is submitted that this evidence
is not relevant to the specific problem of whether D, as a reasonable man,
should have known that P expected payment because it does not tend to show
P's expectations, however much it may justify them. It would seem that a
better rationale for the principal case would be to predicate D's liability upon
quasi-contractual principles. A quasi-contractual obligation would not be
determined by what D should have known or what he in fact contracted to do,
but by the rule of law that the court will presume a man has promised to do
what it is certain he should do. King County v. Odman, 8 Wn.(2d) 32, 111
P.(2d) 228 (1941). Within the quasi-contract field is a rule which would be
applicable to the principal case:
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"A person who has conferred a benefit upon another, manifesting that he
does not expect compensation therefor, is not entitled to restitution merely
because his expectation that the other will make a gift to him or enter into a
contract with hi

is not realized." RESTATEumV

, RESTTUTION, § 57.

This rule is negative in effect; it denies restitution to a party who manifests
that he does not expect compensation irrespective of ns actual intent. Thus a
distinction is made between a party's manifestations and his expectations.
In cases where the manifestations are clear, they control. RESTATENENT,
RESTITUTION, p. 227 In the alternative situation, where the manifestations
of the party conferring the benefit are ambiguous, his intent to receive or not
to receive compensation controls. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION, p. 228. In
short, the primary issues in determination of a case under this rule would be:
(1) did the party conferring the benefit manifest (i.e. by his words and acts)
that he did not expect compensation therefore. (2) If his manifestations were
ambiguous, did he in fact expect to be compensated therefore. It is submitted that the problems presented by the principal case could adequately
be handled under this approach. (See Illustration 7 § 57 RESTATEMENT,

RESTITUTION)
There are, furthermore, several precedents for treating the principal case
as one involving a quasi-contractual obligation. In Thomas v. R. J Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 350 Pa. 262, 38 A.(2d) 61 (1944), T submitted a letter of
commendation to a tobacco company expecting to be paid if the letter was
used for advertising. The letter was never used but an idea in it was. The
court held that T had a cause of action on quasi-contract (though recovery
was denied on other grounds) Plaintiff in Kuhlmann's Estate v. Poss, (Tex.
Civ App.) 220 S. W 564, (1920), had maintained decedent's car, expecting
to be sent away to school when he grew up. The court held that, while there
was no contract, the services were clearly not performed gratuitously and
allowed recovery upon quasi-contract. Recovery has also been allowed for
performing services in expectation of future employment. Thomas v. Thomasville Shooting Club, 121 N. C. 238, 28 S. E. 293 (1897).
Finally, it is suggested that there is a logical reason for not applying the
rules for the construction of implied-in-fact contracts to the principal case.
The services were performed with the understanding on the part of the parties
that they would be compensated for indirectly by an agreement to be made
in the future. Under these circumstances the present intent of the parties was
to contract in the future; therefore, there was no showing of a present intent
to contract. Hence there can be no implied-m-fact contract for compensation.
H.R.V
Fixtures--Tests-Intention of Annexor-Outmoded Cases--Mirrors. After receiving the purchase price of $35,000, the respondent moved
from the premises taking, among other things, a large crystal chandelier, five
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other matching light fixtures and two large mirrors. The mirrors had been
firmly attached to plaster walls in the following manner: A large piece of
three-eighths-inch plywood was firmly nailed to the wall for each mirror,
with at least thirty-six nails in one instance, and the mirrors were attached
to their plywood backing with screws. In a replevin action by appellant, the
trial court found the mirrors and light fixtures were personal property which
respondent had a right to remove. Appeal. Held. Reversed; the chandelier
and sidelights were clearly fixtures. The mirrors presented a closer question,
but each mirror and its plywood backing was considered as one article and
was regarded as having been a portion of the house walls, therefore going to
the purchaser as a fixture. Strain v. Green, 25 Wn.(2d) 692, 172 P.(2d) 216
(1946).
The substitution of cheap plastic imitations for the chandelier and sidelights by the seller was found to be an implied admission that a house without
light fixtutes would not be a complete house. The general test followed by
the court for determining a fixture consisted of the united application of
three requisites: (1) actual annexation to the realty or something appurtenant
thereto; (2) application to the use or purpose to which that part of the
realty with which it is connected is appropriated; and (3) the intention of
the party making the annexation to make a permanent accession to the freehold. This general test is followed in a majority of jurisdictions. Filley v.
Chrtstopher,39 Wash. 22, 80 Pac. 834 (1905), Hall v. Dare, 142 Wash. 222,
252 Pac. 926, 50 A. L. R. 635 (1927), Gasaway v.Thomas, 56 Wash. 77,
105 Pac. 168 (1909), Blake-McFall Co. v. Wilson et al., 98 Ore. 626, 193
Pac. 902 (1920), People's Sarngs & Trust Co., et al. v. Munsert, et al., 212
Wis. 449, 249 N. W 527 (1933), Teaff v.Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511 (1853),
BRoWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY (1936) § 137 The objective intention of the
party making the annexation to make a permanent accession to the freehold
is considered in Washington and a majority of the jurisdictions as controlling.
It is uniformly held that the secret intention of the annexor is ummportant.
Washington National Bank of Seattle v. Smith, 15 Wash. 160, 45 Pac. 736
(1896), Ballard v. Alaska Theatre Co., 93 Wash. 655, 161 Pac. 478 (1916),
Bond Investment Co. v. Blakeley, 83 Cal. App. 696, 257 Pac. 189 (1927),
BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY (1936) § 141. The point of secret intention
'arose in the principal case when respondent argued that the family had
owned the mirrors and chandelier for a number of years, had previously
moved them from house to house in which they had lived, considered them
as personal property and had no intention of making them a permanent part
of the realty when they installed them. Respondent cited previous Washington cases holding bathtubs, hot water heaters and electric light fixtures as
"leading cases in this jurisdiction." In holding that these cases were no
longer authoritative on the point, the court reasoned that, although the cases
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cited had never been overruled, they had been outmoded because "the law
relating to fixtures slowly and gradually changed as the times have changed,"
the changes resulting from an awareness of the fact that "the luxuries of a
given generation become the necessities of the next."
The court is on obviously practical ground in recognizing that household
furnishings, once unusual and clearly personal property, can in time become
widely and commonly used to such an extent that a house without them would
not be complete according to community standards. This approach dearly
presents the ultimate question of whether, under all the facts and circumstances, the ordinary reasonable man of the community would consider the
article in question as a part of the real estate. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY
(1936) § 137
J. P S.
Guaranty Made After Principal Contract-Consideration-Limitations Upon Rule. P and B entered into a contract for distribution of P's
newspapers, the contract requiring that B "deposit and maintain with the
company a satisfactory bond" for performance of his obligations. No particular guarantor was mentioned by name nor was any within the mutual
contemplation of the parties at this time. Several weeks thereafter D signed
as guarantor, the contract reciting the awarding of the principal contract as
consideration. B defaulted on the distributor contract, and P sued D as
guarantor thereof. D argued no consideration for the contract of guaranty
Judgment for D in trial court. Held. Affirmed. The majority cited from
24 Am. Jun. 906 the rule that a subsequent contract of guaranty "is founded
upon a consideration if its execution is the result of previous arrangement,
the principal obligation having been induced by or created on the faith of
the guaranty" and held that its application is limited to the following situation: (1) The guarantor has offered or promised the debtor to guarantee the
debt, and the debtor has communicated this information to the creditor, who
executes the principal contract in reliance thereon; (2) The guarantor makes
such promise direct to the creditor with the same result; (3) The debtor
assures the creditor that, if he later deems the debt insecure, he may look
to a certain person, then named by the debtor, to guarantee the debt. Four
judges dissented, urging that the provision in the principal contract requiring
that a bond be maintained brought the subsequent guaranty contract within
the "same transaction" as the principal contract, thus obviating the necessity
of any new consideration as a matter of law. Cowles PublishingCompany v.
John H. McMann, et al., 25 Wn.(2d) 736, 172 P.(2d) 235 (1946).
With the rule that a subsequent promise of guaranty must be supported by
a new consideration as a starting point, it is well recognized that the rule
is not without exception and that a subsequent guaranty may, in proper
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situations, be sustained by the consideration of the principal contract. Arant
identifies a single exception to the rule: "If goods are sold at the request of
the defendant to a third person, the defendant's subsequent promise to pay
for the goods may be enforced." (ARANT, SURETYsHip, p. 72). Such a statement of the exception embraces limitations (1) and (2) of the majority
without difficulty. Arant finds a further "apparent exception" in the case
where there is "an understanding between the promisee and the principal that
certain persons will later add their signatures to the notes as sureties," (id.),
and this apparent exception is not distinguishable from the majority's third
limitation. However, the exceptions to the rule are usually stated as a single
rule, as quoted by the majority, supra. Essentially the same rule is stated
by the dissent in the instant case; no new consideration is necessary where
the guaranty contract is to be regarded as constituting "a part of the same
transaction" as the principal contract, having been executed pursuant to an
understanding had before and as an inducement to the execution of the
principal contract, or made "pursuant to some provision in the principal contract." Paciflc State Savings & Loan Co. v. Stowell, 7 Cal. App.(2d) 280,
46 P.(2d) 780 (1935), Osborne v. Smith, C. C. Minn., 18 Fed. 126, 5 McCrary 487 (1883).
Among prior Washington decisions and foreign cases cited as authority for
the above statements of the rule, the writer found no case squarely in point
with the present facts. The bulk of controversies present a situation in which
the creditor not only relied upon the promise of a known or named guarantor,
or the promise by the debtor to obtain such guarantor, .but would enter the
principal contract on no other condition. The following is a significant and
perhaps adequate answer to the dissent's efforts to bring the present case
within the "same transaction" rule: In all cases which they cited wherein
the guaranty was deemed a part of the same transaction and supported by
the same consideration as the principal contract, the creditor relied on either
the promise or the known availability of a guarantor named and known to
the creditor at the time of entering the principal contract.
This observation brings into focus-the statement in the majority opinion
that the "basic premise" of the general exception rule is that the creditor, in
entering the principal contract, "relied upon an existing offer or promise of
the guarantor to bind himself at some future date." (italics theirs). And,
in examining the three limitations, supra, which the majority offers as gleaned
from its review of the cases cited in the opinion, it will be seen that the first
and second limitations are dearly consistent with the stated premise. But
the third limitation, if it is to be distinguished from the first, must contemplate
that the understanding as to a guaranty is as yet unknown to the guarantorto-be, or at'least that he has made no affirmative offer, or promise to anyone.
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Therefore, by hypothesis, the third limitation requires no reliance on a commumcated or known offer or promise of guaranty by a person certain at the
time of signing the principal contract. It is thus quite difficult to reconcile
this third limitation with the "basic premise" of the general rule as defined by
the majority And, in fact, a review of cases cited by the majority and by all
other authorities examined by the writer reveals only one which extends the
rule as far as the third limitation. McNaught v. McClaughry, 42 N. Y 22,
1 Am. Rep. 487 (1870). Thus, in identifying and recognizing this third
limitation, the majority takes a position which has extremely limited case
support, and which is substantially contradicted by the majority's own analysis
of the cases and the "basic premise" to be derived therefrom. The present
case would appear then to be of dubious authority were a case to arise in
Washington wherein this limitation would be precisely applicable; as it
would, for example, in the present case, were there offered the mere additional
showing that B had named D as the person to whom P could look for guaranty
V H.
Landlord and Tenant-Action for Unlawful Detamer-Estoppel.
D rented a dwelling house from P D tendered the February, 1946, rental of
$36, 18 days late. P's agent refused the same and, without giving notice to
quit, P brought action for unlawful detainer to recover the premises pursuant
to the provisions of R~x. REv STAT. SuPP (1941) § 814-1. In previous
months the rent had been paid and accepted after the due date apparently
without objection. The trial court concluded as a matter of law that D was
not in default and entered judgment of dismissal. P appealed. Held. Reversed. P is entitled to a writ of restitution, since under the terms of the act
all P need show is that D was holding under a monthly rental of less than
forty dollars; that he was in default on the February installment, and that
subsequent thereto P had not accepted payment. Neitsch v. Tyrrell, 25 Wn.
(2d) 303, 171 P.(2d) 241 (1946).
As a general rule, a landlord may be estopped to avail himself of a forfeiture where, by his words and conduct, he -has led his tenant to believe that
he did not intend to enforce a forfeiture. Conley v. Johnson, 69 Ark. 513, 64
S. W 277 (1901), Moses v. Loomis, 156 Ill. 392, 40 N. E. 952 (1895),
3 THOmPSON ON REAL PROPERTY (Perm. ed. 1940) § 1475. Thus, some
courts hold that a landlord who receives rent late and by his course of conduct
has induced the belief that prompt payment will not be exacted m the future
must give reasonable notice of an intention to return to the strict terms of
the tenancy before a forfeiture can be declared. Templer v. Muncie Lodge, 50
Ind. App. 324, 97 N. E. 546 (1912), Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas
Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 18 Ad. 724 (1889), 3 THompsoN ON REL
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PoPEmRY (Penn. ed. 1940) § 1476. A careful search of the authorities in-

dicates that this problem has apparently never confronted the Washington
court.
The decision in the principal case, interpreting the 1941 act, enables a
landlord to recover premises without giving the twenty-day notice to quit
heretofore required by REr. REv. STAT. § 812 et seq., or the thirty-day notice
under § 10619. Under § 814-1, the service of the summons and complaint
is tantamount to service of written notice to quit. Prior to the 1941 Act, a
landlord in all cases was bound to give statutory written notice before he
could commence action for unlawful detainer. Davis v. Jones, 15 Wn.(2d)

572, 131 P.(2d) 430 (1942), Rowland v. Cook, 179 Wash. 624, 38 P.(2d)
224 (1934).
There was some indication in the instant case that in previous months P
had with some frequency accepted the rent late. The issue is thus raised
as to whether or not, under such circumstances, a landlord may declare a,,
forfeiture by terminating the tenancy without notice and by this summary
process. Under the general rule, a landlord guilty of such conduct would normally be estopped to assert his right to terminate the tenancy without first
giving reasonable notice to pay rent or quit. Indiana is apparently in accord
with the Washington position. In Karas v. Skouras, 79 Ind. App. 99, 137
N. E. 289 (1922), the court in applying a similar statute (BUxs' ANN. ST.
1914, § 8059) failed to find an estoppel where the landiord had indulged his
tenant by accepting late rentals in previous months. The court held that such
conduct did not amount to a waiver of the right to proceed under the statue.
The Washington court in the instant case did not directly pass on the issue
of estoppel, which was not raised by D, but indicated that even though such
a defense were urged, it would be unavailing in the face of the statute.
H.D.
Evdence-Oplnon Rule and Hearsay. In a homicide case the issue
was whether the gun in D's hands was accidentally discharged or whether
he fired it with a premeditated design to kill his wife. The trial court, over
objection, admitted testimony that deceased appeared to be afraid of defendant, and that deceased had stated on a number of occasions that she
was in fear of him. D was convicted and the judgment was affirmed. State
v. Bauers, 25 Wn.(2d) 825, 172 P.(2d) 279 (1946).
Assuming for the moment that the state of mind of the wife was relevant
and that proof thereof could avoid the hearsay rule, the opinion rule appears
to interpose a preliminary obstacle. However, relying on State v. George,
58 Wash. 681, 109 Pac. 114 (1910), the court held the proof admissible
under the exception to the opinion rule which permits a lay witness to give
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his conclusion when it is evident that the factual basis for the opinion cannot
be adequately reproduced. So far as the "fear" of the deceased was concerned, the holding is orthodox enough. But there is authority that testimony
as to the cause of this state of mind is not within the exception because the
witness should be able adequately to reproduce the facts on which he bases
his conclusion as to the agency causing the state of mind and, consequently,
testimony that A was afraid "of B" is an inadmissible conclusion. In re Crssick's Will, 174 Iowa 397, 156 N. W 415 (1916).
The holding is questionable on other grounds as well. Notwithstanding
the court's reliance on State v.George, supra, that case seems distinguishable.
There, the principal issue was premeditation and the court held that proof
of amicable relations between defendant and deceased was admissible. But
here the testimony in question bears, directly at least, only upon the state of
rmnd of deceased which, of course, was not in issue. If the evidence is deemed
probative of hostility on the part of defendant toward deceased, it is hearsay
by orthodox doctrine. So used, relevancy depends upon inferences from the
state of mind of deceased to a belief by her that defendant was hostile, thence
to the fact of hostility This, under nearly all the cases (where the hearsay
point has been raised), is deemed equivalent to an extra-judicial assertion
by deceased of the fact of hostility and thus is inadmissible hearsay McCor.mick, The Borderland of Hearsay (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 489; Falknor,
Silence as Hearsay (1940) 89 U oF PA. L. R. 192. The evidence is in the
same category as an attempt by an accused to exculpate himself by proof
of extra-judicial incriminating conduct (e.g. flight) of a third party, which
is generally excluded if relevancy depends upon inferences from the conduct
to a consciousness of guilt, thence to guilt.
There is a clear distinction between proof on the one hand of the state of
mind of a third party, which is an operative fact or dynamic in characterthat is to say, which looks toward the future-and, on the other hand, of a
state of mind which is relevant only as establishing a belief in the occurrence
of a past event. "Declarations of intention casting light upon the future
have been sharply distinguished from declarations of memory pointing backwards to the past. There would be an end, or nearly that, to the rule against
hearsay if the distinction were iguored." Cardozo, J., in Shepard v. U S., 290
U. S.96 (1933), and see 2 WmmoMR, Evm.NCE (3d ed. 1940) § 267 Thus,
a prior intention to do an act is usually deemed relevant to show that the
act was done. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U. S.285 (1892),
Klein v. Knights and Ladies of Security, 87 Wash. 179, 151 Pac. 241 (1915),
Sound Timber Co. v. Danaker Lumber Co., 112 Wash. 314, 192 Pac. 941
(1920). And contemporary declarations of such a relevant intention are
admissible under a well-recoguized exception to the hearsay rule. Hinton,
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States of Mind and the Hearsay Rule (1934), 1 U. o, CI. L. REv. 394.
But where relevancy of the' state of mind rests only in manifesting a belief
in the occurrence of a past event, the hearsay rule is unavoidable by the
rule of most cases.
H.H.H.
Negligence-Tort and Contract Measure of Damages. P, the owner
of a restaurant and dance building at Shadow Lake, was a subscriber to D's
telephone service. On discovering a small fire in his building, P attempted
to reach the operator in Seattle in order to call the fire department at Kent.
P was unable to make contact with the operator for fifteen minutes, as a result
of which alleged negligent delay he contended he suffered the destruction of
his buildings, and fixtures and loss of future profits, alleging "that if they (the
fire department) had arrived five minutes sooner they could have saved the
building with only minor and inconsequential damage resulting." This appeal
is from a judgment of dismissal rendered upon P's refusal to plead further
after a demurrer to his complaint had been sustained. Held. Judgment of
dismissal affirmed; P's damages were special damages which did not arise
naturally from a breach of D's contract with P, and since P had not notified
D of any special risk, he could not recover. A recovery in tort was also refused,
the court holding as a matter of law that D's negligence was not the proximate
cause of P's loss. Foss v. Pacific Tel. and Tel., 126 Wash. Dec. 87, 173 P.(2d)
144 (1946).
The general rule for measuring damages in an action for breach of contract
is that only those damages may be recovered which arise naturally from such
breach. Special damages can be recovered only when notice of special risk
or circumstances is communicated to the defendant. Hadley v. .Baxendale
(1854) 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Reprint, 145, 5 Eng. Rul. Cas. 502; WILLISTON,
LAW or CONTRACTS, (Rev Ed. 1937) § 1356. This rule is followed in Washington. Sedro Veneer Co. v. Kwapil, 62 Wash. 385, 113 Pac. 1100 (1911),
Martinac v. Bakovic, 158 Wash. 193, 290 Pac. 847 (1930). The court in
applying this rule in the principal case made an analogy to telegraph company
cases, where, in suits brought for a negligent failure to provide service, it was
held as a prerequisite to recovery of special damages that the telegraph com-

pany be informed of the special risk. WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS (Rev.
Ed. 1937) §§ 1356, 1357 But is this a good analogy? Each time one sends
a telegram one has the opportunity to notify the telegraph company of any
special circumstances. But if, in the telephone cases, the negligence of the
telephone company prevents one from notifying them of any special circumstances, it is questionable whether this is a valid reason for denying recovery.
It should be noted that the contract for a telegram is usually one contract
for a single service, while a contract for telephone service is one contract for
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continuous service. Recovery has been allowed in cases where the telephone
company has notice of the special risk involved on a single call for a regular
subscriber and then negligently fails to perform. Boldig v. Urban Tel. Co.,
224 Wis. 93, 271 N. W 88 (1937), Vinson v. So. Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 188
Ala. 292, 66 So. 100, L. R. A. 1915C 450 (1914) Lack of notice thus gives
virtual immunity in cases like the principal one.
This is the first time an action to recover for negligent delay in supplying
a telephone connection has occurred in Washington. Will this also be the
last case on the point in Washington, as a result of this decision? The court
has seemingly closed the door to any recovery in either contract or tort.

J. V
Forcible Entry and Detaner-Persons Entitled-Title to Property. The Commercial Waterway District No. 1 dredged a new channel for
the Duwamish River through land purchased in fee under the authority of
the commercial waterways act of 1911. (Rnu. REv STAT. §§ 9724-9776-10),
the shores of this channel became new tideland due to the action of the tide
from Elliott Bay In 1930, without authority, two houseboats were built
upon these tidelands; the defendant acquired title to those houseboats by bill
of sale in 1943. Alleging title to the tide lands, the District brought action in
unlawful detainer for the removal of the houseboats, under Ris. REv STAT.
§ 812-(6). The defendant alleged the District was not the owner, nor entitled
to possession of the tideland, nor authorized to institute this action, but that
title to the newly created tidelands vested in the State of Washington under
WASH. CONST. Art. XVII. Judgment was for the District and the defendant
appealed. Held. Affirmed; the District was authorized to institute action,
either by virtue of title to land through which the new channel was dredged,
or title in the new tidelands released to the District by the state in the
statutes of incorporation. The effect of the constitution upon subsequent
artificial tidelands was not determined. The court admitted "some confusion"
in the issues involved under the unlawful detainer statutes, but assumed that
title must be proved when alleged. Commercial Waterways District No. 1
v. C. J Larson, 126 Wash. Dec. 206, 173 P.(2d) 531 (1946).
There are two unlawful detainer acts in Washington. By the laws of 1891,
unlawful detainer is defined as entering the land of another without permission
or color of title, and provision is there made for a remedy which includes
appending to the complaint an abstract of title which shall be proved according to the ejectment statute, in the event the defendant denies such title.
(REm. REv. STAT. §§ 834-837) The second act originally set out five conditions whereby unlawful detainer arose from a landlord-tenant relationship
only, and was included in the general forcible entry and detainer statute.
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(REm. REv. STAT. §§ 810-812). The confusion resulted when this second
unlawful detamer act was amended in 1905 by the addition of a clause that
was not restricted to a landlord-tenant relationship, but pertained to anyone.
This amendment duplicated the definition of unlawful detamer by unauthorized entry as set out in REm. REv. STAT. § 834, but prescribed no remedial
procedure. (REM. Rzv. STAT. § 812-(6).) That these are two independent
enactments was determined in Columbia and Puget Sound Railroad Co. v.
Moss, 44 Wash. 589, 87 Pac. 951 (1906)

It has been held that in an action

of unlawful detainer under REm. REv. STAT. § 812, the right to possession
is the only issue and the question of title is excluded. Angel v. Ladas, 143
Wash. 622, 255 Pac. 945 (1927). Also, title may not be tried in an action
in unlawful detainer. Meyer v. Beyer, 43 Wash. 368, 86 Pac. 661 (1906).
The rule that title is not in issue in unlawful detainer actions has been established in other jurisdictions. Lipscomb v. Moore, 228 Ala. 365, 153 So. 393
(1934), Richardson v. King, 51 Idaho 762, 10 P.(2d) 323 (1932), McAdams
v. Austin, (Mo. App.), 72 S. W.(2d) 513 (1934). In other jurisdictions,
deeds, papers, or statements as to title are admitted as evidence, not to show
title, but rather to show the nature and extent of possession. Pemberton v.
Hardin, 258 Ky 538, 80 S. W.(2d) 589 (1935), McAdams v. Austin, supra.
But in the instant case the court cited Columbia and Puget Sound Railroad
Co. v. Moss, supra, as a possible precedent for holding that title is necessary
in order to bring action under the unlawful detainer provisions of REM. REv
STAT. § 812. In the Columbia case a prima facie case was made out by alleging and proving (1) title, and (2) that after entering without permission or
color of title and after due notice to vacate, defendant had failed to remove
from the premises. The court in the principal case questioned that proof of
title was necessary in an unlawful detainer action, but assumed from the
Columbia case that title must be proved when alleged, and that the plaintiff
had proved such title.
By such a negative holding the court avoided a question which has not
yet been decided in Washington: Need surplus allegations be proved? Redundant matter may be stricken out on motion, (REM. REv. STAT. § 286),
but can it be said that when surplusage is not stricken it must be proved?
Other courts have held that unnecessary allegations need not be sustained.
Salsman v. Bloom, 172 La. 238, 133 So. 760 (1931), Noell v. Chicago &_
E. L Ry. Ca. (Mo. App.) 21 S. W.(2d) 937 (1929), Mankofsky-Goldstem
Shoe Co. v. I W Carter Co., (Mo. App.), 33 S. W.(2d) 1049 (1931), St.
Clair v. State Highway Board, 45 Ga. App. 488, 165 S. E. 297 (1932). But
because of the ambiguity arising out of the two unlawful detainer acts in
Washington, it would appear that while an allegation of title is unnecessary,
it must, if alleged, be proved.
J.S.O.
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Contempt -Proceedings - Affording Defendant Opportunity to
Exculpate Himself. D was convicted of criminal contempt and sentenced
to fifteen days in jail for violating a routine court order restraining him from
disturbing or annoying his wife and barring him from their home, during the
pendency of her divorce action, except to visit the minor children at suitable
times. D admitted in his pleadings that he went to his home "for the purpose
of catching or punishing a paramour" that he supposed was lurking there.
The trial court sustained a demurrer to evidence offered by D that -he saw
his wife lying on the bed with a partially undressed man, that he broke a
window for the purpose of entering and forcing the man to leave, and that
he did not enter when a vase was thrown at him by his wife. The court stated
that the admissions in the pleadings established the charge of contempt as a
matter of law, and accordingly refused to hear his offered oral evidence.
D appealed on the ground that the court erred m not permitting him to introduce evidence tending to prove his innocence, or in case of guilt, to submit
evidence of mitigating circumstances. Held. Judgment reversed. D was
entitled to introduce evidence tending to prove that he had not been guilty
of contempt, and, even if guilty, to show that ins acts were to some extent
excusable. Since an outright killing, under such circumstances, is frequently
held to be justifiable homicide, or merely manslaughter, the court felt that
the evidence was admissible as tending to excuse the violation of a routine
court order barring him from his home or at least as tending to mitigate the
offense. Trowbridge v. Trowbrtdge, 126 Wash. Dec. 146, 173 P.(2d) 173
(1946)
As a general rule, when a contempt is committed in the immediate view and
presence of the court, the court may, in committing the offender, act of its own
knowledge without further proof or examination, and the accused is not
entitled to be heard in his own defense, nor can he complain that ns constitutional rights are infringed by the refusal of a hearing. Ra.m. REv. STAT.
§ 1051, State v. Budress, 63 Wash. 26, 114 Pac. 879 (1911), State ex rel.
Dysart v. Cameron, 140 Wash. 101, 248 Pac. 408, 54 A. L. R. 311 (1926),
State ex rel. Dailey v. Dailey, 164 Wash. 140, 2 P.(2d) 79 (1931), Ex Parte
Terry, 128 U. S.289 (1888).
In the instant case the contempt, if any, was not committed in the presence
of the court. Where the contempt occurs out of the presence of the court,
the prosecution involves many of the characteristics of a formal trial, including the filing of affidavits, the filing of charges and giving notice thereof to
the contemner. Rxim. REv. STAT. § 1052; State v. Winthrop, 148 Wash. 526,
269 Pac. 793 (1928) With respect to constructive contempts or those which
are committed without the actual presence of the court, it is essential that
a hearing should be allowed and the contemner permitted, if he so desires,
to present a defense to the charges before punishment is imposed. State v.
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Nicoll, 40 Wash. 517, 82 Pac. 895 (1905), Ex Parte McClean, 151 Wash.
192, 275 Pac. 546 (1929), State v. Zioncheck, 171 Wash. 388,. 18 P.(2d)
35 (1933), affirmed on rehearing 171 Wash. 395, 23 P.(2d) 1118 (1933).
In Cooke v. U S., 267 U. S.517 (1925), itwas held that the mere admission by an attorney that he wrote a letter impugning the honesty and
impartiality of a judge with respect to a case being tried before him, and not
yet finished, was not sufficient to justify his summary punishment for contempt without opportunity to be heard and offer evidence to excuse or mitigate
his offense.
In the principal case, it is evident that the defendant was not summarily
denied notice or representation by counsel. The trial court, however, refused
to consider -the evidence offered by the defendant which might excuse or
mitigate the offense. The court in reversing this decision applied the general
rule -that before a party accused of out of court contempt shall be judged in
,contempt, he must be accorded an opportunity to explain or excuse his contempt. Whether or not moral justification might operate as a total excuse for
the violation of the literal terms of the order, there can be no doubt ,that the
evidence might justify the court 'in refusing to punish or in making punishment nominal. The refusal of the trial court to receive the evidence offered
practically amounted to the denial of a hearing under the rule of the cases
cited bherem.
M.G.W

Neglfgence--Evidence-Presumptions and Burden of Proof. In
an action for personal injuries, the evidence showed that P, pedestrian, was
found lying on the street twenty-one or twenty-seven feet toward the center
of the block from the pedestrian cross-walk with the right front wheel of a
municipal bus resting on her left leg. The headlights of the bus were defective
and had not been burning, although the street lights and headlamps of all
.other vehicles were being used. As a result of a concussion incurred in the
accident P developed a slight amnesia and was unable to recall anything
from a time when she was on the sidewalk in the proximity of the intersection
until she regained consciousness in the hospital. She testified that it had been
her intention prior to the period of her,loss of memory to use this particular
cross-walk to reach her proven destination, to which it directly led. The
driver of the bus, which had just completed a left turn at the four-way,
red-and-green light controlled intersection, against the heavy, morning rushhour traffic, testified, "When I entered the pedestrian crossing I didn't see
anybody.
but after about twenty-mght feet away, out of the pedestrian
crossing in front of the bus I felt an impact of some kind. I thought I seen
something brown. I thought it was a woman's hat. I don't know what made
me think that or anything." Upon the foregoing and additional evidence by
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each party the jury rendered a verdict for P Held. There was insufficient
evidence to permit a finding by the jury that P was on the cross-walk when
struck, or to support the verdict for P (Four justices dissented.) Ferguson
v. Seattle, 127 Wash. Dec. 52, 176 P.(2d) 445 (1947)
It is a general rule that where an accident results m instant death, the law,
out of regard to the instinct of self-preservation, presumes the deceased was
at the time m the exercise of due care. Smith v. Seattle, 172 Wash. 66, 19
P.(2d) 652 (1933), Fothergill v. Kaija, 183 Wash. 112, 48 P.(2d) 643
(1935), 38 Am. JuR. 987 It is reasonable and "well established" that the
same rule applies where loss of memory or other incapacity renders the
survivor of an accident incapable of testifying, if the incapacity is the result
of the accident. Tubb v. Seattle, 136 Wash. 332, 239 Pac. 1009 (1925),
141 A. L. R. 873 (1942) and cases therein cited. The rule appears to have
been applied so as to presume spectfic conduct on the part of deceased, or P
Karp v. Herder, 181 Wash. 583, 44 P.(2d) 808 (1935) (that P stopped at a
stop sign before entering an arterial; and that P's auto yielded the right of
way to D's vehicle), Steele v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 21 Wash. 287,
57 Pac. 820 (1899) and Baltimore & P R. Co. v. Landrzgan, 191 U S. 461
(1903) (that P stopped, looked, and listened before going upon a railroad
track) Therefore, it appears that under the facts of the principal case it can
be reasonably contended that there is a legal presumption that P was on the
pedestrian cross-walk and using due care when run down by the municipal
bus.
Although it appears that in Washington the presumption of due care has
heretofore been applied only upon the issue of contributory negligence, it
seems logical and correct upon principle that the presumption should also
apply in a case such as this, where the question of D's negligence per se is
entirely dependent upon P's conduct, and the unusual accident has rendered
P incapable of testifying as to that conduct. When used in this manner the
presumption of due care performs the function of a true presumption (i.e.,
relieves the party upon whom rests the burden of persuasion, of the burden
of going forward with the evidence in the first instance. THAYER, PRELmwiNARY
TREATiSE ON EVIDENCE (1898) p. 337, 5 WIGHoRE, EVIDENCE, § 2487) It
also loses the anomalous characteristics which have been pointed out in connection with its use, on the issue of contributory negligence, in a jurisdiction
such as Washington where contributory negligence is an affirmative defense,
and the burden is already on D to prove contributory negligence by a preponderance of the evidence. Falknor, Notes on Presumptions (1940) 15
WAsH-r. L. REv. 71. The presumption of due care is here used as a true presumption, performing the functions set forth by Thayer, supra, and Wigmore,
supra, as it does in the jurisdictions in which the rule is thought to have
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originated, where the burden ison P in a personal injury action to show, in
the first instance, that he was exercising due care. Greenleaf v. Ill. Central
R. Co., 29 Iowa 14, 4 Am.Rep. 181 (1870), 33 L.R.A. (N.s.) 1111 (1911),
6 IOwA L.BULL. 55 (1920).
Assuming arguendo that a presumption of due care can be rebutted by the
testimony of interested witnesses, as was said of another presumption in
Bradley v.Savzdge, Inc., 13 Wn.(2d) 28, 123 P.(2d) 780 (1942), D's evidence in this case can scarcely be said to have been "uncontradicted, unimpeached, clear and convincing" as is required by the rule of the Bradley
case. Moreover, it has been held that "the presumption of due care
is
not overcome by the testimony of interested witnesses, or from inferences
that may be drawn from circumstantialfacts." Reinhart v. Oregon-Waskington R. & N Co., 174 Wash. 320, 24 P.(2d) 615 (1933), Gillett v. Michigan United Traction Co., 205 Mich. 410, 171 N. W 536 (1919), Mattingley
v. Oregon-Washington R. & N Co., 153 Wash. 514, 280 Pac. 46 (1929).
Therefore it seems doubtful whether D presented evidence sufficient to meet
or rebut the presumption of due care. This fact, coupled with the evidence
of P's immediate intention, proven destination and the conditions under
which the left turn was made, add up to make tis an extremely close decision.
C. H. H.

